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Abstract 
This paper highlights an empirically significant trade-off between the aid flows delivered by 
donor countries and the inflows of migrants that they receive from developing countries. It draws 
implications for aid policy from a simple game-theoretic model, after reviewing the recent 
literature on the effects and motivations of foreign aid to developing countries. The paper is part 
of the recent effort made by economists to discover the hidden agenda behind foreign aid. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Are migrants a blessing or a curse? In rich countries, the threat of an invasion by poor 
migrants from the South is evoked time and again, especially before important elections. It seems 
that a sizable constituency exists for exerting pressure on governments with a view to inducing 
them to erect legal barriers against immigration. Some northern European countries that were 
once very liberal in this respect have recently witnessed the emergence of a National Front–type 
movement, with a fairly aggressive attitude toward immigration. At the same time, there are 
voices cautioning that keeping migrants at bay is nothing like a free good. 
Remittances are the key benefit that developing countries receive from the outflows of 
migrants that they send to rich countries every year. For many developing countries, they exceed 
foreign aid receipts. Klein and Harford (2005) demonstrate that remittances are now one of the 
main sources of external finance for developing countries and one that is growing steadily. 
Gubert (2003) presents a striking calculation: if France accepted just 60,000 more Malian 
migrants, and if the new migrants had the same propensity to send remittances home as those 
currently living in France, total remittances would be equivalent to the aid that France is currently 
sending to Mali. This is a negligible number of migrants for a country whose population is more 
than 1000 times larger. The added migration would reduce public expenditures, as the aid budget 
and the French aid administration could be cut sizably and fewer police would be needed for 
tracking illegal migrants.  
This kind of calculation suggests that the opportunity cost of fighting immigration in rich 
countries must be sizable. Anti-immigration constituencies must therefore perceive considerable 
detrimental effects on their countries, to convince them to accept these costs.  
This paper attempts to identify whether there are policy tools, apart from visa control, that 
governments of the North can (and do) use to curb immigration from the South. In particular, 
we want to test whether foreign aid is such a tool. The analysis is best seen as part of a research 
program that seeks to discover the true agenda behind foreign aid, which the so-called aid-
ineffectiveness literature has shown to be different from the proclaimed goal of boosting growth 
and fighting poverty in the recipient country. The following paragraphs review studies on the 
effects and determinants of migration. Section 2 discusses the aid-ineffectiveness debate. In 
section 3, a simple game-theoretic model is sketched, and some testable predictions are derived. 
The empirical analysis of section 4 suggests that aid does indeed belong to the toolbox used by 
rich-country governments to control immigration. Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
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Impacts of Immigration Flows on Destination Countries 
The effects of immigrant flows on host countries have been widely studied in the economics 
literature. Most of the research on this topic has looked at the impact on the labor market and, in 
particular, on the wages and employment rates of the receiving country‘s natives. The simplest 
theoretical model of labor market equilibrium suggests that immigration is liable to create a 
pecuniary externality, as an increase in the labor supply resulting from the inflow of immigrants 
will lead to lower wages or, in the presence of wage rigidities, to higher unemployment. In reality, 
this negative effect may be mitigated by adjustments in the labor market. For example, firms may 
move to regions where labor is becoming cheaper, thus increasing labor demand there, or natives 
may move away from the regions where the migrants have arrived. Using data from U.S. 
decennial censuses for the period 1960–90 and from the 1998–2001 current population surveys, 
Borjas (2003) finds that immigration has a considerable negative impact on the wages of native 
workers. Card (2001) shows that immigration flows in the late 1980s in U.S. cities with large 
immigrant populations reduced the relative employment rates of low-skilled natives by up to 1 
percent and their relative wages by no more than 3 percent. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) review 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of immigration on host countries‘ wages and 
conclude that this impact is very small. Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005), on the basis of their 
meta-analysis of 18 empirical studies of this type, conclude that there is a robust negative and 
statistically significant, but small, impact of immigrants on natives‘ wages and that this impact is 
larger in Europe than in the United States.  
Beside its effects on the economy, immigration also has demographic and political effects on 
the host countries. From a demographic point of view, immigration may offer a way of 
decreasing the age-dependency ratio in industrial countries since immigrant populations are often 
younger than the natives and have higher fertility rates. From a political point of view, some 
countries may worry that immigrants threaten their national identity and their ethnic and cultural 
stability. The creation by French President Nicolas Sarkozy of a Ministry of Immigration, 
Integration and National Identity is a response to this type of anxiety. There are also fears of 
infiltration by potential terrorists or drug traffickers. These political concerns seem to play a role 
at least as important as the economic impacts described above in determining decisions by 
immigration authorities. Neumayer (2006) shows that the poorer, the less democratic, and the 
more exposed to armed political conflict a country is, the more its citizens are likely to be subject 
to visa restrictions. The same is true for nationals of countries that were the origins of terrorist 
attacks. It thus seems that migrants from the poorest countries are less welcome than migrants 
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from rich countries. Since the poorest countries are also the most important recipients of foreign 
aid, it is natural to ask whether foreign aid is used to reduce immigration from them.  
Some empirical findings shed light on the determinants of the public opinion toward 
immigration and on its influence on immigration policies. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), using a 
direct measure of the U.S. population‘s preferences concerning immigration, obtained from the 
1992 National Election Studies, show that less-skilled workers are more likely to prefer limitation 
of immigrant inflows into the United States. Mayda (2006), using individual-level survey data sets, 
finds that skilled individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration in countries where the relative 
skill composition of natives vis-à-vis immigrants is high. She also finds that concerns about the 
impact of immigration on crime rates, perceptions of the cultural effect of foreigners, racist 
feelings, and the size of inflows of asylum seekers affect attitudes towards immigration. 
According to the same paper, countries with higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP) are, 
on average, less open to immigration, after allowing for the influence of individual-level variables. 
O‘Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find that individual attitudes toward immigration reflect economic 
interests, as well as nationalist sentiment. The authors show that among labor market 
participants, the highly skilled are less opposed to immigration than the low skilled; this effect is 
larger in richer countries than in poorer ones and in countries with greater equality than in 
countries with more inequality. Among those who are not in the labor force, noneconomic 
factors are more important than economic considerations in determining attitudes toward 
migration. Facchini and Mayda (2008) use a sample of 34 countries which were included in the 
1995 and 2003 rounds of the International Social Survey Programme to show that voters‘ 
negative opinions toward migration explain the restrictive migration policies in place in most 
destination countries. They demonstrate that countries in which the median voter is more 
opposed to migration tend to implement more restrictive policies.  
Determinants of Immigration Flows 
Many arguments have been advanced explaining, without necessarily justifying, why 
governments of the global North want to curb immigration into their countries. The key question 
is whether they actually do anything about it: are there policy handles that they use to reduce 
inflows? Visa quotas allow only an imperfect control of immigration flows, since most developed 
countries have family reunification laws and asylum and refugee protection treaties that oblige 
them to accept some immigrants. Moreover, visa quotas do not reduce the number of illegal 
entrants, as discussed by de Haas (2006). Illegal aliens are estimated to add 10 or 15 percent to 
the foreign-born stock in countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Hatton and Williamson (2002) note that about 300,000 illegal immigrants 
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enter the United States every year, and 400,000 to 500,000 enter Western Europe. Since the visa 
instrument alone is not a sufficient solution, it has to be completed with other policies that affect 
immigration flows.  
The rich empirical literature aimed at discovering the determinants of immigration flows has 
produced a good crop of convergent findings. Mayda (2007), using a panel of bilateral migration 
flows to 14 OECD countries by country of origin between 1980 and 1995, finds that income 
improvements in the destination countries, as well as the share of the young population in the 
country of origin, have positive and significant effects on emigration rates, while the distance 
between the countries has negative effects. Jennissen (2003), studies the economic determinants 
of net immigration in Western Europe for the period 1960–98. He finds that destination GDP 
per capita, existing migrant stock, and the educational level of the population have positive 
effects, while unemployment rates have a negative effect on net migration flows. Hatton and 
Williamson (2002) present a quantitative assessment of the economic and demographic 
fundamentals that drive world migration across historical periods and around the world, using 
data on average net immigration from 1970–75 to 1995–2000 for 80 countries. They find that the 
share of the population age 15–29 in the receiving country has a negative effect on its 
immigration rates, while that the immigrant stock has a positive effect on net immigration. They 
also document that a rise in domestic income relative to the world and to the region both 
increase a country‘s net immigration. Neumayer (2005), using a panel on the annual number of 
asylum seekers in Western European countries by country of origin between 1982 and 1999, 
finds that human rights abuses, political violence, and state failure, as well as economic conditions 
in the country of origin are the main determinants of asylum migration. He suggests that 
generous development assistance and the opening of protected European markets to imports 
from the sending countries could ease migration pressure.  
From the above-cited literature, income differentials appear to be an essential determinant of 
the supply of immigrants. Castles (2003) claims that reducing North-South inequality is a key to 
effective migration management. As foreign aid is a transfer that reduces North-South income 
differentials, it is quite natural to ask whether foreign aid reduces migration flows. Morisson 
(1982) argues that the most promising way for development assistance to influence migration in 
the short-to-medium run is through employment-generating activities and, in the long run, by 
reducing population growth and improving income distribution. Surprisingly few quantitative 
studies exist on the link between aid and migration. Some exceptions are Rotte and Vogler 
(2000), who study international migration to Germany from 86 countries between 1981 and 1995 
and find no significant effect from aid. Berthélemy, Beuran, and Maurel (2009) estimate the two-
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way impact of aid and migration using cross-country data and find a positive impact of aid on 
migration in a simultaneous-equation system. The aim of this paper is to complete this literature, 
by testing whether foreign aid reduces immigration flows from South to North. 
 
2. The Search for Foreign Aid’s Hidden Agenda 
The academic literature on foreign aid has been at times quite paradoxical. It caught the 
public‘s attention under the generic name of the ―aid-ineffectiveness‖ literature; Easterly (2006) 
surveyed it in an influential review aimed at a broad audience. The aid-ineffectiveness literature 
shows quite consistently that foreign aid is not very successful at boosting growth and reducing 
poverty in recipient countries. The contributors to this body of work end up expressing severe 
criticism of the international community, which appears unable to pursue its proclaimed 
objective. The World Bank‘s recent slogan, ―Our Dream: A World Free of Poverty,‖ seems 
bound to remain just a dream. This conclusion appears to challenge the standard methodology of 
economics at a fundamental level. How is it that the international community has consistently 
spent zillions of dollars in foreign aid for nearly six decades without being ―effective.‖ Are there 
no error-correction mechanisms that can put an end to this ―massive waste‖? But the apparent 
paradox only concerns a small share of the academic literature on aid and is the result of some 
hasty interpretation of the findings.  
The Aid-Ineffectiveness Puzzle  
The root cause of the turmoil is that some economists have taken at face value the declared 
objectives of foreign aid. The stated objective has always been to boost economic growth in the 
recipient country. For a long time, aid was focused on filling the ―saving gap‖— the allegedly 
insufficient national saving flow that was supposed to afflict poor countries. Collier (2007) 
suggests that the change in emphasis which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, from economic 
growth to poverty alleviation, was the result of a public relations campaign aimed at harnessing 
electoral support in favor of foreign aid from all sides of the political spectrum in rich countries. 
Academic economists, however, soon started to blow the whistle, demonstrating that there was 
not much empirical support for the view that foreign aid was promoting growth in poor 
countries or reducing significantly the incidence of poverty.  
A much-cited paper by Boone (1996) triggered a wave of debate on aid ineffectiveness by 
showing that no significant impact of aid on growth could be found in cross-country regressions. 
In a highly influential paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue forcefully that in analyzing the 
effect of aid, due account must be taken of heterogeneity among recipient countries. The authors 
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favor an index of the quality of macroeconomic policies as their heterogeneity parameter because 
their findings suggest that aid boosts growth when it is given to countries that have a sound 
macroeconomic policy framework. Similarly, Svensson (1999) presents cross-country regression 
findings showing that aid is more effective at affecting growth in more democratic countries. In 
the same vein, Kosack and Tobin (2006) find that foreign aid and democracy have a positive 
impact on economic growth and human development, provided that there is a minimum level of 
human capital in the recipient country. Nevertheless, the dominant diagnosis is that, in general, 
with some noteworthy exceptions, aid is not boosting growth. Some authors blame the failure of 
aid on the misconceived approach of conditionality (see, for example, Collier, 1997). A number 
of theorists propose clever schemes for fixing aid (see Svensson 2000, 2003; Azam and Laffont 
2003). Another influential response has been to claim that aid has not been effective because 
there has not been enough of it—what was needed was a ―big push‖ to lift people out of the 
―poverty trap.‖ This view was forcefully supported by Sachs (2005); Collier (2007) espoused a 
more subtle variant.  
These findings and the response that they triggered raise a more fundamental methodological 
issue: do they mean that aid is ineffective, or does the true agenda of aid differ from the much-
publicized goals of fostering growth and alleviating poverty? The proper methodology of 
economics is based on revealed-preference theory: instead of trying to assess the effectiveness of 
foreign aid by looking at the extent to which it achieves its stated objective, we should try to infer 
its true agenda from its actual achievements. When people spend zillions of dollars over decades, 
they must certainly have achieved a measure of success that justifies the continuation of this 
expenditure flow. Some economists have tried to discover the hidden agenda of foreign aid by 
looking at the determinants of its allocation across countries. Their results suggest that the impact 
of foreign aid on growth and development is probably not the crucial determinant of its 
allocation. For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that the good quality of the 
macroeconomic policies pursued by a given country does not make the country more likely to 
receive more aid, although it does makes aid more ―effective.‖ Similarly, Svensson (1999) 
presents a cross-country regression analysis showing that although aid is more effective at 
promoting growth in more democratic countries, those countries are not more favored as aid 
recipients. This finding suggests that aid allocation is governed by other considerations, hinting 
again that there is a hidden agenda aside from the generous drive to alleviate poverty. 
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Donors’ Revealed Preferences 
The political dimension of aid allocation is further analyzed by Alesina and Dollar (2000), 
who find that the colonial past and strategic alliances are the main determinants of the amount of 
aid received by poor countries. They also show, however, that in the time-series dimension, 
democratization is often followed by increased aid, although there is no significant static effect of 
democracy. By contrast, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), in a panel data analysis covering 137 aid 
recipients and 22 bilateral donors during the period 1980–99, find a significant positive impact of 
the Freedom House index of civil liberty and political rights. This finding is confirmed in a later 
study using a different estimation method (Berthélemy 2006). The latter two studies bring out 
quite strongly that in allocating aid, most bilateral donors seem to be guided by their self-interest 
and, in particular, by their commercial relationships. Fleck and Kilby (2006a) show that 
commercial concerns play an important part in determining the allocation of U.S. bilateral aid 
across countries, particularly when the president and/or Congress are conservative. The results 
reported by Fleck and Kilby (2006b) suggest that the validity of such a diagnosis can be extended 
to the case of the World Bank, whose aid allocation behavior is significantly influenced by U.S. 
trade and political interests. One may wonder, however, whether trade flows are perfectly 
exogenous, at least as far as bilateral donors are concerned. Although many donors have formally 
ruled out tied aid, toward the end of the 1960 to 1997 sample period considered by Fleck and 
Kilby (2006a) some implicit and subtle ways of tying aid probably continued in operation. 
Moreover, aid helps finance the trade deficit of developing countries, and this certainly increases 
imports from industrial countries, which are also the main donors. This effect is even more likely 
toward the end of the period of analysis, as trade liberalization was a prominent feature of the 
reform programs supported by foreign aid under the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Hence, some reverse causation between aid and trade may be present, channeled by various 
mechanisms, so that the above findings might be misleading. 
Chauvet (2002) looks at the relationship between aid allocation across countries and various 
kinds of ―sociopolitical instabilities‖— referring to events that reflect political troubles in the 
recipient countries. She distinguishes three types: (a) elite instability, including coups d‘état, 
revolutions, and major government crises; (b) violent instability, including political assassinations, 
guerrilla warfare, and civil wars; and (c) social instability, such as strikes, demonstrations, and 
riots. She shows that these three types of event have different effects on the allocation of aid, 
depending also on the kind of aid. Instabilities of types (a) and (b) have a positive impact, 
suggesting that aid flows are directed at governments that are under political threat, while type (c) 
has a negative effect, showing that aid shies away from threats directed more specifically at the 
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economy. These results suggest that donors give aid to recipient governments in response to 
political motivations, with a kind of conservative bent toward providing support to incumbent 
governments. Economic issues such as growth and poverty alleviation seem to play only a 
secondary role, in that governments facing greater ―social instability‖—the likely response of 
some constituencies to economic hardship—are somehow punished by getting less aid money. 
This whole line of empirical research tries to infer from the determinants of aid allocation across 
countries what donors are really trying to achieve, but it fails to test directly for the impact of aid 
on the presumed objectives. 
Alesina and Weder (2002) use a slightly different empirical strategy, looking directly at the 
effect of aid on some potential objectives of the donors. They show that the level of corruption 
plaguing the recipient government does not significantly affect the allocation of aid across 
countries but that there is a significant effect in the other direction. Their results suggest that an 
increase in aid this year increases the level of corruption next year—what they call the ―voracity 
effect.‖ They thus conclude that donors do not care about corruption in the recipient country. 
Similarly, Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and Thelen (2008) look directly at the effects of 
aid on some potential objectives of the donors while taking due account of reverse causation. 
Using such a structural econometric approach, they show that aid is effective at fighting terrorism 
and that donors allocate aid across countries with a view to pursuing this objective.  
Our paper represents a further attempt at identifying a donor objective, by testing whether 
aid is actually used to reduce migration from poor countries.  
 
3. The Implications of the Aid-Migration Trade-Off 
A very simple model is sufficient for capturing the main issues raised by the potential trade-
off between aid and migration when rich countries use aid policy to reduce migration inflows. It 
is most likely that (assuming the aid is effective in the first place) there are some spillovers, 
insofar as the aid given by one donor might reduce simultaneously migration outflows from the 
recipient country in the direction of both the donor country and other destinations. This means 
that some free riding is bound to occur unless donors coordinate their actions. The model 
discussed next illustrates this point. 
The Model 
Assume that there are three countries in the world: two donor countries, labeled 1 and 2, 
whose level of affluence potentially attracts migrants, and a developing country, whose flows of 
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migrants to each donor country are designated 1n  and 2n . The donors have the possibility of 
giving aid to the poor country, with a view to reducing the flow of migrants that they receive 
from it. Two main mechanisms can explain why aid can have a negative impact on the migration 
flow. First, aid can help create an improved economic situation in the recipient country by 
supporting productive investments and creating jobs. Second, aid can provide an inducement to 
the recipient government to try to deter out-migration, if the assistance is conditional on the 
adoption of policy measures aimed at reducing outflows. For example, financial incentives can be 
created in favor of returning migrants, thus reducing the net outflow, other things being equal, or 
migration-prone groups can be targeted with specific actions. In Mali and Senegal, for example, 
the Soninke ethnic group is the most migration prone because of the well-established diaspora 
that they can rely on (Azam and Gubert, 2006). A co-development project has been implemented 
with French aid money with a view to reducing migration by members of this group by 
developing attractive programs in their region of origin.  
Let 1a  and 2a  denote aid flows from countries 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that the inflow 
of migrants in donor country 1 is governed by the following function: 
  1 1 2, ,n f a a  .         (1) 
We assume that the impacts of the two aid flows on 1n  are negative, reflecting the aid-
migration trade-off that we want to analyze. The negative impact of a country‘s own aid flow is 
quite plausible for the reasons discussed above, but the cross effect deserves additional comment. 
If aid has a positive effect on the level of economic activity and the creation of jobs that might 
reduce the attractiveness of migration for nationals from the developing country, then it cannot 
be assumed that this will affect only the outflow directed at each donor country separately; there 
is necessarily some spillover on the outflow to the other country. In the limit, it could be argued 
that only the total aid flow, 1 2a a , matters for the outflows of migrants, if the two aid flows 
have the same impact on the recipient economy. The more general specification embedded in 
equation (1), however, allows for some finer targeting by donor countries, which might devise 
policies that mainly affect the migration flow heading in their direction. This could be done, for 
example, by targeting a specific ethnic group that is connected to an important diaspora in one of 
the donor countries.  
The parameter   captures the set of the other variables that are liable in either country to 
affect the outflow of migrants. By permuting the subscripts 1 and 2, we can readily generate the 
equivalent function to equation (1) for donor country 2. 
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𝑓(𝑎1 ,𝑎2
𝑁 ,𝜃) 
𝑓(𝑎1 ,𝑎2
∗ ,𝜃) 
𝐶 
𝑁 
𝑁  
 
𝐿 𝑎1,𝑛1, 𝜆 = 𝐿
𝑁  
Assume then that country 1 is prepared to incur the cost of providing aid if itshows some 
effectiveness in reducing the migration flow in its direction. This is captured by assuming that 
country 1 seeks to minimize the following loss function: 
  
1 1, 1 1
min , ,a n L a n  ,        (2) 
which is increasing and convex in its first two arguments. This captures the facts that aid entails a 
cost for the donating country, by using up some fiscal revenues, and that, for whatever reason, 
that country‘s government tends to feel that its country is attracting too many migrants. The shift 
parameter   captures the contextual variables that are liable to affect the government‘s feelings 
about immigration, such as elections or other political determinants. A similar function is 
assumed to govern the choices made by country 2.  
Nash-Equilibrium Aid and Migration Flows 
If the two countries determine their aid policies without any coordination between them, the 
aid flows and the migration flows will be determined by the Nash equilibrium of the game, where 
each player takes the other player‘s strategy as given. 
Figure 1: Nash-Equilibrium and Optimum Aid Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors‘ elaboration. 
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1), when the aid flow chosen by donor 2 is at its Nash-equilibrium value, 
2
Na . The assumed 
convexity of the curve captures the idea that aid has a decreasing marginal impact on the inflow 
of migrants, so that even a very high aid flow would not reduce their number to zero. Then, 
donor 1 will choose its best-response aid flow, 
1
Na , at the point where an indifference curve for 
the loss function (2), represented by the concave curve 𝐿 𝑎1,𝑛1, 𝜆 = 𝐿
𝑁  is tangent to the aid-
migration trade-off. The resulting point, labeled N  in figure 1, is the Nash-equilibrium joint 
choice of aid flow 
1
Na  and migration inflow 1
Nn  made by country 1, given the equilibrium aid 
flow 
2
Na  chosen by country 2. The Nash equilibrium value of the loss function is equal to 𝐿𝑁  for 
country 1. A similar diagram could obviously be drawn for country 2.  
The case for Coordinating Aid 
One can easily see that this Nash-equilibrium is inefficient from the point of view of the 
donor countries. Too little aid is being donated in equilibrium because of a free-rider problem. 
The spillover effects of aid on migration analyzed above are likely to dilute the incentives of each 
donor to extend aid in order to reduce immigration. In the Nash equilibrium, each player takes 
the equilibrium choice of the other as given. The two players, however, could improve on this 
outcome by coordinating their aid decisions in order to take the spillover effects into account. 
The intuition for this result can be grasped by looking at the dashed lines in figure 1. Point C  
represents such a coordinated equilibrium outcome. Notice that if donor 2 increases its aid flow 
from 
2
Na  to 𝑎2
∗ , the aid-migration trade-off facing donor country 1 moves downward, to 
𝑓(𝑎1 ,𝑎2
∗ ,𝜃). This downward shift reflects the spillover effect of country 2‘s aid flow in reducing 
the inflow of migrants into country 1, for each level of 𝑎1. In the coordinated equilibrium, donor 
1 will reciprocate the increased aid given by donor 2 at a point such as C , where 
1 1*
Na a . Point 
C  is located on a lower indifference curve than point N —thus corresponding to a loss function 
value lower than 𝐿𝑁—and so donor 1 is better off in this coordinated equilibrium point than in 
the Nash equilibrium. This occurs even though donor 1 spends more money on aid, because it 
receives a lower inflow of migrants in return. A similar diagram could obviously be drawn for 
donor country 2. 
Figure 1 also suggests that such a coordinated equilibrium requires an ability by the players to 
commit irreversibly to the coordinated aid levels 𝑎1
∗ and 𝑎2
∗  in order to avoid the temptation to 
renege ex post. Once player 2 has engaged 2 *a  so that the aid-migration trade-off has shifted 
downward to the dashed line  1 2, *,f a a  , player 1 is tempted to reduce its own contribution 
by moving leftward along the trade-off in order to reach an even lower indifference curve of its 
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loss function—to a point such as N , where the indifference curve is tangent to  1 2, *,f a a  . 
Anticipating this, player 2 might then be deterred from increasing its own aid flow in the first 
place. Both donor countries need to have a credible way of tying their own hands if a coordinated 
outcome is to come about. As a matter of fact, we can observe in the real world that the donor 
community is expending considerable effort to make its pledged contributions credible, using 
methods ranging from the international definition of the Millennium Development Goals to the 
creation of powerful aid-dependent constituencies in their own countries (perhaps by tying aid to 
the advantage of some powerful firms or by creating an overstaffed aid administration). 
Nevertheless, unless we are prepared to assume that donor countries are coordinating perfectly 
their aid policies regarding the reduction of migration inflows, this free-riding problem suggests 
that the aid flows that we observe in the real world are probably below their optimal values.  
The foregoing short theoretical analysis of the implications of the aid-migration trade-off 
rests heavily on the assumptions that such a trade-off does exist in the real world and that there 
are some spillovers such that the aid given by one country is likely to affect the inflow of 
migrants entering another country. The empirical exercises offered in the next section aim at 
testing whether these two assumptions are supported by the data. 
4. Empirical Results 
A quick look at figure 2 does not seem very promising for the aid-migration trade-off 
hypothesis. This figure traces the yearly flow of immigrants into, and the total ODA 
disbursements by, the Development Assistance Committee members between 1995 and 2005. 
There appears to be a positive correlation between the number of immigrants coming to a donor 
country and the amount of foreign aid that the latter disburses. The following section shows that 
this first impression is misleading. 
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Figure 2: Disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Entry of 
Immigrants in some OECD Countries 
 
Source: Author‘s elaboration based on data from OECD.Stat. 
 
Search for a Structural Equation 
The positive correlation shown in figure 2 does not represent any meaningful behavioral 
relationship between aid and migration because it fails to control for many relevant variables. 
Nevertheless, Berthélemy et al. (2009) find a similar positive relationship between the two in an 
equation that controls for numerous variables. They cautiously explain it by referring to ―policy 
coherence,‖ arguing that donor countries are actively combining their aid and migration policies. 
Our results outlined below suggest instead that these authors face a specification problem. The 
model presented above implies that aid disbursements and migration inflows are jointly 
determined in equilibrium, as Berthélemy et al. (2009)‘s analysis suggests, but with different 
predictions.  
By changing the other determinants of the migration inflow that we have captured by the 
parameter  , we can generate some comparative-static predictions that are compatible with 
figure 2. Imagine that such an exogenous change shifts the aid-migration trade-off upward. Then 
it is most likely that the equilibrium points N  or C  will move to the northeast, that is, upward 
and to the right, indicating that both the aid disbursed and the migration inflow increase 
simultaneously. The reason for such shifts is that if more migrants are forthcoming for a given 
aid flow, the donor country will respond both by increasing its aid flows somewhat and by 
allowing a bit more migration because the marginal impact of aid on migration is decreasing. The 
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latter effect entails an increase in the marginal cost of reducing immigration through increased 
foreign aid. This mental experiment suggests two things that a correct empirical analysis should 
take into account: (a) it is crucial to include the correct control variables in the migration equation 
in order to identify correctly the aid-migration trade-off, and (b) the aid flow itself is probably 
endogenous and this should also be controlled for. As most econometric methods for controlling 
for endogeneity entail a potential loss of efficiency, we first present the results without taking this 
problem into account. We then test whether this estimation procedure gives rise to a significant 
endogeneity bias in a second stage. This two-step approach allows us to perform two tests of 
interest with one equation—that is, to test (a) whether aid has a significant negative impact on the 
inflow of migrants, and (b) whether donors are actively using foreign aid as a policy response 
aimed at reducing the migration inflows that they face. 
To test our predictions, we use data on yearly immigration flows into, and on aid 
disbursements by, the Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD between 
1995 and 2005 taken from OECD.Stat. The immigration flows we consider are legal entries of 
migrants from low-income and lower-middle-income countries. The restriction to low income 
origin countries is meant to capture the idea that donor countries are not viewing the inflows of 
migrants from other rich countries in the same way as they do inflows from poorer countries2. 
The aid variables we consider are net ODA disbursements and multilateral aid disbursements in 
constant US dollars. 
As control variables, we use the GDP per capita (in constant US dollars) and unemployment 
rates in these destination countries, taken from the 2006 World Development Indicators. We also 
control for the stock of foreign population and the social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 
taken from OECD.Stat.  
Our empirical specification is: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡−1,  
where 𝑚𝑖𝑡  is the flow of immigrants in country 𝑖 at date 𝑡 (in Log), 𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 is the stock of 
immigrants (in Log), 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the GDP per capita (in Log), 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 is the unemployment rate, 
𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 is the percentage of social expenditures in the GDP and 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 is total aid disbursed by 
country 𝑖 at date 𝑡 − 1 (in Log). All explanatory variables are lagged once in order to mitigate 
endogeneity problems that might affect the control variables and to account for potential time 
lags in the response of migration flows to changes in incentives.  
                                                          
2 In the appendix we present some robustness checks where the inflows of immigrants from upper-middle-
income countries and high-income countries are also included in the immigration flows variable. 
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 We estimate this equation using country fixed effects. This estimation method allows us 
to control for unobserved country-specific effects which are time invariant, such as the 
immigration policies which were constant over our sample period. Moreover, it may provide 
some information on the determinants of the total number of migrants, which the aid-migration 
trade-off is likely to govern, while we only have data on legal entries. The following argument 
explains why.  
Assume that the number of legal migrants is a random fraction of their total number, which 
reflects, among other things, the immigration-restriction policy enforced by the destination 
country. Then, because we are working with the logarithm of the number of legal migrants, the 
mean value of that random fraction feeds into the country-fixed effect, while the deviations 
relative to that mean are feeding into the residuals. Formally, if Ln  is the number of legal 
migrants and n  is the total number of migrants, we can assume that: 
  ,Ln G n  ,         (3) 
where G  is a set of variables that captures the immigration-restriction policy stance of the 
government and  0 , 1G    is the random share of legal migrants, depending on the 
exogenous shock variable . Then, by taking the logarithm of equation (3), we get 
  ,LLog n Log G Log n   .       (4) 
Therefore, unless the restriction policy pursued by each government has changed drastically 
over our relatively short sample period, it should be well controlled for by the country-fixed 
effects. This assumes that, with respect to immigration-restriction policy, there is more variation 
across countries than within each country over time. Then our equations explaining the logarithm 
of the number of legal migrants should, in fact, tell us a great deal about the total number of 
migrants entering each country. 
Table 1 presents the regression results. In columns (1) and (3), we do not control for 
endogeneity of foreign aid; that is done in columns (2) and (4). The method used for performing 
this control is based on the Hausman test and is further discussed below.  
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Table 1: Regression Results on Flows of Legal Migrants from Low-Income and Lower-
Middle-Income Countries 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate 
 
 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.18*** 
(0.08) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.14** 
(0.08) 
Social expenditures 
(percent of GDP) 
 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
Log of per capita 
GDP 
 
0.54 
(1.42) 
9.53*** 
(2.82) 
0.54 
(1.42) 
14.80*** 
(4.97) 
Log of stock of 
foreign population 
 
0.19 
(0.57) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.17 
(0.59) 
0.91* 
(0.47) 
Log of official 
development 
assistance (ODA) 
disbursements 
 
0.46 
(0.32) 
3.68*** 
(1.15) 
0.43 
(0.28) 
5.15*** 
(1.66) 
Log of 
multilateral 
disbursements 
 
  0.10 
(0.27) 
1.43 
(0.90) 
Endogeneity bias, 
ODA 
 
 4.47*** 
(1.26) 
 5.90*** 
(1.73) 
Endogeneity bias, 
multilateral 
disbursements 
 
   1.50 
(0.96) 
Number of 
observations 
118 117 118 116 
F-test 9.50 9.84 7.87 7.64 
*:significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
 
The unemployment rate is highly significant, reflecting the deterrent effect of a depressed 
labor market in the host country. When the probability of finding a job is low in the destination 
country, migrants seem to postpone their travel or even to cancel it. The social expenditures 
policy pursued by the target country is an important attraction factor, and it is significant in all 
the columns. Countries that spend more on social items such as health and education are 
obviously more attractive to migrants than countries with a more conservative policy stance. 
Then, we find a strange result for per capita GDP in columns (1) and (3), where it seems to have 
a negligible impact on the inflow of migrants. This counterintuitive result suggests the presence 
of an estimation problem. Fortunately, this effect is not robust to the correction of the aid 
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endogeneity bias, as this coefficient becomes positive and significant in columns (2) and (4). It 
thus seems that the impacts of the business cycle and national income on immigration are well 
captured by the unemployment rate and GDP per capita.  
Finally, the existing stock of foreign population already residing in the country of destination 
is only significant at the 10 percent level in equation (4). This variable is meant to reflect the 
network effects that play a key role in the migration process, as has been shown by many studies. 
For example, Azam and Gubert (2006) demonstrate that such an effect can explain an ethnic bias 
in migration. They show that two ethnic groups living in the same region of the Senegal River 
valley, in western Mali, and thus facing the same economic conditions, have very different 
migration patterns. The authors use historical evidence to document that the group with a long 
history of out-migration is sending a much higher fraction of its population abroad than the 
group without such a migration history. The established diaspora from the first group serves as a 
bridgehead that reduces the costs of migration for the prospective new migrants from that same 
group by helping them find jobs and accommodations and by providing the informal credit and 
insurance services that migrants‘ networks are known for delivering to their members. Our 
findings reported above suggest that such an effect is not very strong at the country level, once 
the impact of foreign aid is taken into account. The stock of foreign population in the destination 
country is probably too coarse a measure to capture this effect. 
 
Testing for the Impact of Aid 
To gain some insight into the relative effectiveness of various aid flows, we use the log of 
official development assistance (ODA) disbursements by the destination country and test 
whether multilateral aid disbursements have a differential impact by introducing that variable in 
addition to ODA. Arguably, the multilateral aid variable captures a much better coordinated aid 
policy than ODA, which includes considerable bilateral aid. This interpretation reflects the idea 
that the principal donors have a say in the way the World Bank and other multilateral donor 
agencies determine multilateral aid disbursements and that they also have a clear opportunity to 
coordinate their decisions regarding these disbursements at board meetings or in the corridors. 
The model presented above suggests that coordinated aid flows could have some multiplier 
effects, as they imply a quid pro quo by other donors. It turns out that ODA disbursements 
represent the most significant aid variable coming out of our regressions (2) and (4), with the 
predicted negative sign. This is consistent with our theoretical framework, which suggests that 
foreign aid is probably an effective tool for reducing the inflow of migrants into rich countries. 
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The model, however, also raises the question whether coordinated aid is a more powerful tool 
against immigration than uncoordinated aid. Total ODA, which includes both bilateral aid and 
the contributions channeled through the Bretton Woods entities and other multilateral 
institutions, could be less effective than multilateral aid taken separately. Our findings, however, 
do not support the differential impact hypothesis. This suggests that in fact donor countries 
somehow manage to coordinate their bilateral and multilateral aid flows equally well.  
The technique applied in columns (2) and (4) for controlling for aid endogeneity is derived 
from the standard Hausman test. Two auxiliary reduced-form equations are estimated for log of 
ODA and log of multilateral aid, which are assumed endogenous in our theoretical framework. 
The instruments used for ODA and multilateral disbursements are the log of public expenditures 
on order and security, taken from OECD.Stat and the percentage of right-wing members in 
parliament, taken from two websites3. The log of government revenues, taken from OECD.Stat 
is added as an additional instrument for the estimated equation (4). These instruments are 
regarded as the contextual variables captured by   in equation (2) of the theoretical model. The 
estimations of the reduced form equations are presented in appendix table B1. ODA is 
significantly correlated to the public expenditures on order and security and multilateral aid is 
significantly correlated to the percentage of right wing in parliament. The residuals from these 
equations are then included, in addition to the aid variables themselves, in columns (2) and (4), 
and their estimated coefficients provide estimates of the endogeneity biases for each variable. 
Inclusion of these residuals in the equations provides an additional benefit, as it corrects the 
estimated coefficients of the aid variables themselves for the endogeneity bias that affects them in 
the uncontrolled equation. For the tests performed at columns (2) and (4), the residuals are 
obviously lagged. The corresponding estimates of the endogeneity biases are presented in table 1 
under that entry.  
In column (2), where ODA only is included, we find that it is strongly significant, and the 
exogeneity assumption is rejected at the 1 percent level. The correct interpretation of this test as 
an endogeneity test is not immediate. The specification of the immigration function in columns 
(1) through (4) assumes that the inflow of migrants responds to incentives with a one-year lag. 
The endogeneity test performed in columns (2) and (4) assumes that the government in the 
donor country adjusts its aid flow in year t  1 on the basis of its forecast that a component of 
the random shock will affect the immigration flow in year t; this forecast is presumed to be based 
on some information that is not available to the econometrician. For example, the government 
                                                          
3
 http://www.parties-and-elections.de 
http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/BMEncyclopedie/BMEncycloListePays.jsp). 
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may be using a lead indicator based on the number of visa applications in year t  1 that will only 
show up as actual migration in the subsequent year, and this is a piece of information that we 
have not been able to include in our estimated equations. Similarly, the government of the host 
country might be aware of sociological or institutional changes affecting a resident diaspora that 
are likely to affect the latter‘s ability to attract new migrants, but this is something the 
econometrician does not know. The reduced-form equation for aid reflects in its residuals this 
anticipation by the government in year t  1. The latter is then necessarily correlated with the 
random shock occurring in year t, by construction, if our behavioral assumption correctly 
captures the way the donor government is forming its expectations.  
The two aid variables are included in column (4). Only ODA is found to be significant 
and endogenous. Hence, ODA might not be worse than multilateral aid after all, suggesting that 
donors have found various methods for obtaining the required coordination for their other aid 
flows. After all, many of them have been in this line of business for about six decades, so that the 
aid game might safely be approximated by an infinite-horizon repeated game. It is known that 
this kind of setting is likely to foster cooperation between the players. Our findings thus suggest 
that donor countries are doing a good job of equalizing the marginal impact of each kind of aid 
flow, so that aggregation of flows into a single ODA variable is legitimate for econometric 
purposes. 
Some robustness checks are presented in the appendix. In tables C1 and C2, we include 
immigrants from upper-middle-income counties and high income countries in the immigration 
flows variable. As these immigrants come from countries which are not important aid recipients, 
we expect the ODA variable to be less significant in these regressions and this is what we 
observe. In table C3, we add the income tax as an additional regressor. The income tax variable is 
significant only when immigrants from high-income countries are included in the immigration 
flows. It has no effect on immigration flows from low income and lower-income countries, and 
the significant negative sign of ODA remains. 
In the foregoing econometric exercise, two key results seem robust: (a) foreign aid has a 
significant negative impact on migration inflows into donor countries, and (b) donors are actively 
using aid as a policy tool for reducing immigration. The third result that we tested, concerning the 
effectiveness of aid flows coordinated through multilateral institutions in relation to that of other 
aid flows, leads us to reject the view that bilateral aid is less effective.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the assumption that donor countries employ foreign aid partly as 
a tool for controlling inflows of migrants. A brief theoretical analysis was used to bring out the 
main predictions that can be derived from such an assumption. The model helped us identify the 
potential free-rider problem raised by the assumption and suggested that donors must find a 
coordinated equilibrium if they want to optimize the impact of their aid as a means of reducing 
immigration. Such a coordinated equilibrium requires donors to find a way of tying their own 
hands in order to make their commitment not to renege ex post on their pledged disbursements 
credible. We suggested that in the real world donors are in fact using various mechanisms to 
create this credible commitment, ranging from the international definition of the Millennium 
Development Goals to the formation of powerful aid-dependent constituencies in their own 
countries. Techniques for developing the latter in the real world include, among other methods, 
the tying of aid to benefit powerful firms and the creation of an overstaffed aid administration. In 
addition, donors have created international aid institutions, such as the World Bank, whose job is 
precisely to coordinate at least some of the aid flows. 
The empirical tests performed using a panel of data on DAC member countries between 
1995 and 2005 show that our assumed aid-migration trade-off is indeed supported by the data. 
The empirical approach used to produce these findings is based on two requirements brought out 
by the theoretical analysis. First, it is important to include in the estimations various control 
variables, which are likely to affect both immigration flows and aid disbursement flows. Second, 
due account must be taken of the fact that governments choose jointly the level of foreign aid 
that they deliver and the in-migration that they permit, so that the former must be regarded as 
endogenous in the econometric analysis. Our empirical analysis provides support for these two 
predictions. We further tested whether the amount of aid disbursed through a coordination 
mechanism, which we have proxied by multilateral aid disbursements, is any more effective than 
the other aid flows, here captured by ODA disbursements. Our results suggest that total ODA is 
not performing any worse than its multilateral aid component, but this might reflect econometric 
problems, as these two variables are strongly correlated with one another. Our econometric 
exercises fail to support the view that there is a significant free-rider problem with bilateral aid 
flows and hence that there is significant underprovision of aid. Nevertheless, our tests of this 
assumption do not seem very powerful, and further investigation of this issue is warranted. In 
particular, a finer disaggregation of aid flows might be required in order to perform a convincing 
analysis of the free-rider problem. This points the way for future research.  
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Appendix 
A. Some Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1 : Average yearly immigrant flows over the period 1995-2005 
Country Migrants from 
low-income 
countries 
Migrants from 
lower-middle-
income countries 
Migrants from 
upper-middle-
income countries 
Migrants from 
all countries 
Australia 9560,0 9437,6 12222,6 119910,1 
Austria 
 
5719,6 34078,8 84060,1 
Belgium 2120,4 7942,1 6725,8 61354,1 
Canada 43294,9 29226,1 15276,2 222336,3 
Denmark 2857,0 3532,5 2508,7 22738,8 
Finland 354,1 998,9 2550,2 9373,8 
France 15451,3 46071,3 13596,3 99840,6 
Germany 4742,8 49960,2 267771,0 651513,6 
Greece 886,0 10727,0 13046,0 38151,0 
Ireland 
   
29118,2 
Italy 19880,7 95515,0 64613,7 265120,5 
Japan 4296,2 81037,9 34541,3 310583,1 
Luxembourg 
   
10994,2 
Netherlands 3230,6 10174,5 9416,4 77778,4 
New Zealand 5166,9 6705,4 4806,8 42064,5 
Norway 2418,5 4146,5 3449,6 25879,3 
Portugal 3017,7 12724,4 9658,8 32934,0 
Spain 13836,1 134405,8 102570,5 385301,3 
Sweden 2617,6 9314,8 4342,3 40938,9 
Switzerland 
  
8613,0 86560,8 
UK 28826,1 13297,6 27894,9 266335,7 
USA 133382,2 239054,4 202154,0 861356,1 
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Table A2: Average yearly ODA disbursements over the period 1995-2005 (constant USD, 
millions) 
Country ODA to low-
income 
countries 
ODA to lower-
middle-income 
countries 
ODA to 
upper-middle-
income 
countries 
Australia 253,9 319,3 27,7 
Austria 91,8 264,1 28,4 
Belgium 354,3 151,0 21,7 
Canada 444,1 413,6 52,7 
Denmark 529,2 168,5 49,5 
Finland 96,9 91,7 4,9 
France 1562,9 1355,0 385,4 
Germany 1094,2 1769,3 165,9 
Greece 8,7 108,0 5,3 
Ireland 185,2 21,7 12,2 
Italy 475,0 291,1 2,9 
Japan 1079,3 3662,8 153,8 
Luxembourg 56,9 38,4 6,1 
Netherlands 978,7 699,6 86,1 
New Zealand 39,6 41,9 8,3 
Norway 660,6 411,0 66,2 
Portugal 276,6 11,1 1,1 
Spain 189,4 673,3 76,8 
Sweden 485,7 307,4 56,7 
Switzerland 239,8 223,2 21,4 
UK 1295,7 681,2 184,5 
USA 2096,0 4455,6 194,2 
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Table A3: Average values of the control variables over the period 1995-2005  
Country Unemployment 
rate  
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
USD) 
Social 
expenditures 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Stock of foreign 
population 
Income 
tax (%) 
 
Australia 6,9 27226,3 17,3 4482000,0 24,4  
Austria 4,3 28316,0 25,8 720293,3 10,2  
Belgium 8,4 26909,3 26,1 882183,5 27,4  
Canada 7,9 27607,4 17,7 4971000,0 20,3  
Denmark 5,2 28083,2 27,2 256850,0 33,4  
Finland 10,7 24978,1 23,6 92566,2 26,8  
France 10,1 24642,6 28,3 3252602,0 12,3  
Germany 8,5 25333,4 26,9 7208836,0 20,8  
Greece 10,4 18710,1 20,8 402790,0 1,5  
Ireland 6,7 27487,4 14,8 153692,9 16,5  
Italy 9,8 24997,5 22,8 1527383,0 18,8  
Japan 4,4 25615,9 15,6 1685760,0 6,4  
Luxembourg 3,1 51289,2 21,9 161492,7 11,3  
Netherlands 4,1 28302,5 20,6 686212,9 7,1  
New Zealand 5,6 21047,1 19,0 
 
20,8  
Norway 4,1 35603,5 23,6 184388,5 21,4  
Portugal 5,9 16356,3 20,1 293014,5 6,4  
Spain 13,1 20771,4 20,7 1169233,0 12,9  
Sweden 6,9 27117,3 30,6 493823,5 26,2  
Switzerland 3,6 30815,4 18,8 1404938,0 10,2  
UK 5,9 25316,6 19,7 2410000,0 16,4  
USA 5,1 33680,1 15,2 18300000,0 17,5  
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Table A4: Average values of the instruments over the period 1995-2005  
Country Public 
expenditures on 
order and security 
(USD millions) 
Right wing 
members in 
parliament 
(%) 
Government 
revenue(USD 
millions) 
Australia 3761,2 47,7 170432,8 
Austria 3576,9 55,3 116387,5 
Belgium 5058,0 62,3 137999,6 
Canada 11816,1 75,7 320512,9 
Denmark 1892,6 50,1 107021,6 
Finland 3656,5 24,6 77051,5 
France 22367,9 37,5 801067,1 
Germany 34272,9 46,7 1033239,0 
Greece 1531,0 43,1 70809,5 
Ireland 3659,5 69,8 41352,7 
Italy 26293,3 53,9 593221,6 
Japan 55338,5 66,1 1354059,0 
Luxembourg 748,6 61,1 10259,4 
Netherlands 7339,0 51,4 208564,0 
New Zealand 1632,0 47,5 29425,0 
Norway 2039,7 43,3 106028,0 
Portugal 3383,3 44,6 54190,8 
Spain 12654,2 46,9 277408,6 
Sweden 3802,0 28,9 160240,7 
Switzerland 24786,2 68,6 101396,5 
UK 46211,9 52,4 631277,3 
United States 556997,2 48,6 3283873,0 
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B. First-stage reduced form equations 
Table B1: First-stage reduced form equations for Table 1 regressions 
Explanatory variables Dependent 
variable:  
Log ODA 
Disbursements 
for eq.(2) 
Dependent 
variable:  
Log ODA 
Disbursements 
for eq.(4) 
Dependent 
variable:  
Log Multilateral 
Disbursements  
Log Public Exp. on order 
and security 
 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
Percentage Right Wing in 
Parliament 
 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
Log Government Revenues 
 
 
- -0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.33* 
(0.19) 
Unemployment rate 
 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Social expenditures (%) 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Log Per capita GDP 
 
 
1.87*** 
(0.36) 
1.95*** 
(0.38) 
1.10*** 
(0.42) 
Log Stock foreign population 
 
 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.23** 
(0.59) 
Nb. Obs. 159 156 156 
F -test 48.59 39.86 17.31 
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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Table B2: First stage reduced form equation for Table C3 regressions: 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable : 
Log ODA disbursements 
Log Public expenditures on order and 
security 
 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
Percentage of Right Wing in 
Parliament 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Unemployment 
 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Social expenditures 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Log Per capita GDP 
 
 
1.60*** 
(0.40) 
Log Stock of Foreign Population 
 
 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Income Tax 
 
 
-0.02*** 
(0.008) 
N Obs 159 
F statistic 54.92 
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
  
28 
 
C. Some Robustness Checks 
 
Table C1: Immigrants from upper-middle-income countries and high-income countries 
included in the dependent variable; ODA only. 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: 
Log Inflows from LIC, LMIC and 
UMIC 
 
Dependent variable: 
Log Inflows from all 
countries 
Unemloyment rate 
 
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
Social Expenditures (%) 
 
0.28*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
Log Per Capita GDP 
 
 
6.89*** 
(2.58) 
0.30 
(1.17) 
2.43 
(1.81) 
-0.83 
(0.88) 
Log Stock Foreign 
Population 
 
0.71 
(0.48) 
0.61 
(0.53) 
0.93** 
(0.37) 
0.79** 
(0.40) 
Log ODA 
Disbursements 
 
-2.39** 
(1.06) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
-1.26* 
(0.66) 
 
0.21 
(0.21) 
Endogeneity Bias ODA 
 
2.93** 
(1.12) 
 1.55** 
(0.71) 
 
N Obs 
 
125 135 146 156 
F Statistic 14.43 13.52 7.70 8.97 
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
LIC: low-income countries; LMIC: lower-middle income countries; UMIC: upper-middle income 
countries. 
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Table C2: Immigrants from upper-middle-income countries and high-income countries 
included in the dependent variable; ODA and multilateral aid. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Dependent variable: 
Log Inflows from LIC, LMIC, 
UMIC 
Dependent variable: 
Log Inflows from all 
countries 
Unemloyment rate 
 
 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.08) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Social Expenditures (%) 
 
 
0.31*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
Log Per Capita GDP 
 
 
11.54** 
(4.54) 
0.30 
(1.17) 
-0.82 
(0.88) 
1.37 
(2.96) 
Log Stock Foreign Population 
 
1.02** 
(0.44) 
0.59 
(0.54) 
0.78* 
(0.41) 
0.84** 
(0.38) 
Log ODA Disbursements 
 
 
-3.66** 
(1.53) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
0.16 
(0.19) 
-0.93 
(0.91) 
Log Multilateral Aid 
Disbursements 
 
-1.31 
(0.85) 
0.12 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
0.28 
(0.59) 
Endogeneity Bias ODA 
 
 
4.19*** 
(1.57) 
  1.20 
(0.94) 
Endogeneity Bias Multilateral 
Aid 
 
1.37 
(0.89) 
  -0.21 
(0.61) 
N Obs 
 
124 135 156 145 
F Statistic 11.20 11.16 7.69 7.04 
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
LIC: low-income countries; LMIC: lower-middle income countries; UMIC: upper-middle income 
countries. 
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Table C3: Income tax included as an additional regressor 
Explanatory variables Dependent 
variable : 
Log Inflows LIC, 
LMIC 
Dependent variable : 
Log Inflows LIC, LMIC 
and UMIC 
Dependent variable : 
Log Inflows from all 
countries 
Unemloyment rate 
 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.21*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.08) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
Social expenditures 
(%) 
 
0.27*** 
(0.08) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Log Per Capita GDP 
 
9.31*** 
(2.67) 
0.89 
(1.36) 
6.70*** 
(2.43) 
0.61 
(1.12) 
2.82* 
(1.67) 
-0.06 
(0.78) 
Log Stock Foreign 
Population 
 
0.74 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.55) 
0.86* 
(0.45) 
0.75 
(0.50) 
1.00*** 
(0.35) 
0.86** 
(0.37) 
Income tax 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Log ODA 
disbursements 
 
-3.88*** 
(1.22) 
0.74** 
(0.32) 
-2.42** 
(1.12) 
0.59** 
(0.26) 
-1.12 
(0.71) 
0.42** 
(0.18) 
Endogeneity bias 
ODA 
 
4.93*** 
(1.36) 
 3.20*** 
(1.21) 
 1.62** 
(0.78) 
 
N Obs 
 
117 118 125 135 146 156 
F Statistic 9.18 9.09 13.54 13.08 10.46 11.75 
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
LIC: low-income countries; LMIC: lower-middle income countries; UMIC: upper-middle income 
countries. 
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